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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant, Robert Lee Dixon, was convicted 
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, of the crime of the distribution of 
a controlled substance for value in violation of Utah Code 
Ann., § 58-37-8 (1953). The Honorable James S. Sawaya, 
Judge, presided. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty by the jury of the 
crime of the distribution of a controlled substance for 
value and was sentenced on December 16, 1975, by the 
Honorable Judge James S. Sawaya, to the Utah State Prison 
for an indefinite term not to exceed fifteen years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this court reversing 
the judgment rendered by the trial court and a ruling 
remanding the case to the trial court for a new trial* 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant-appellant was tried on the charge 
of the distribution of a controlled substance for value on 
December 8, 1975, in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
The witnesses for the prosecution were two Salt 
Lake City policemen, Michael Roberts and Kenneth L. Thirsk, 
and a former heroin addict, Denise Giertz, who was working 
as an undercover operative for the police. 
Sixteen potential jurors were called and sworn. 
(T. 3) The prosecution passed the panel for cause. (T. 19) 
The defense counsel, Mr. Beasley, requested leave and was 
granted the right to reserve any challenges for cause until 
after the impaneling process. (T. 19) The defense counsel 
and the prosecution each used their four pre-emptory challen 
The remaining eight jurors were sworn to try the case. 
Following the prosecutor's opening statement, Mr. 
Beasley, for the defense, challenged for cause four members 
of the jury panel on the grounds that they all had served | 
on prior jury panels where identical witnesses and the same 
identical charge and verdicts of guilty had been returned. 
(T. 23) The motion was denied by the court. | \ 
I 
The police officers and Ms. Giertz testified for 
the state. The defendant testified for the defense. There 
were no other witnesses or evidence. The only two persons 
who allegedly participated in the unlawful transaction 
were Ms. Giertz for the prosecution and Mr. Dixon, the 
defendant. (T. 97) 
Officer Roberts testified for the prosecution 
that he drove Ms. Giertz to the vicinity of the West Side 
Motel, that she left the car on foot and returned ten 
minutes later with a balloon of heroin in her mouth. (T. 52) 
Ms. Giertz testified that she walked to the West 
Side Motel and entered by herself. She met the defendant 
inside the Motel and began talking with him. (T. 38) She 
stated that she bought for $40.00 a balloon of heroin from 
him at this time. (T. 40) Placing the balloon in her 
mouth, she left the motel and returned to the police car. 
(T. 40) 
The defendant, Robert Lee Dixon, was called as 
a witness in his own behalf and denied the occurrence of 
both the alleged conversation and the sale of heroin to 
Ms. Giertz. (T. 144) He further stated that his last 
conviction occurred in 1967. (T. 143) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: WHERE THE SOLE DEFENSIVE MATTER IS AN ATTACK 
ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES, 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE OF FOUR JURORS WHO HAD 
SERVED ON FOUR PREVIOUS JURYS RENDERING 
GUILTY VERDICTS IN WHICH THE SAME STATE'S 
WITNESSES HAD TESTIFIED AND BEEN FOUND 
CREDIBLE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19(5) (1953) provides 
a challenge for cause for implied bias of a potential 
juror if the prospective juror: 
(5) (Has) served on a trial jury which 
has tried another person for the offense 
charged. 
One possible construction of the above statutory lan-
guage is that a juror is not disqualified to serve 
on a criminal case merely because he had theretofore 
served on a jury which tried another defendant of a 
like offense arising out of a separate and distinct 
transaction from that in the pending case, and having 
no connection therewith other than the similarity in 
the violation of the crime charged. Haussener v. United 
States, 4 F.2d 884 (1925). In Haussener, the defendants 
were convicted of unlawful sales of intoxicating liquor. 
Five of the jurors who served in this case had previously 
sat in other cases, against other persons, charged with 
some violation of the Volstead Act, wherein one or both 
of the government prohibition agents testifying had been 
i 
the only witnesses in the other cases. On voir dire, 
it was apparent that some of the jurors had formed and 
still had a certain opinion as to the credibility of the 
prohibition agents. The court held that the five jurors 
should not be disqualified giving two reasons in support 
of it's decision. First, the court stated that the 
defendant's challenge for cause as to these five jurors 
would be denied because the only challenge made was to 
the whole array of the jury, as impaneled, and this was 
an insufficient challenge. Second, the court stated 
that impaneling a jury composed of persons who had never 
before heard the testimony of the two prohibition agents 
would so impede the court's business as to make the 
enforcement of the Volstead Act difficult. Haussener 
at 886. Clearly, the Haussener court was attaching 
more importance to the court's efforts to save time than 
the defendant's constitutional right to an impartial 
jury. Addressing this subject, Judge Merrimon said: 
The great importance of trial by 
jury is sometimes lost sight of, even in 
courts of justice, in the disposition of 
petty misdemeanors, cases of no great 
moment, and what are called "plain cases." 
In the economy of time, the hurry of 
business, lack of attention, and hasty 
consideration, irregular and unwarranted 
methods of trial are adopted, allowed, 
and tolerated, and thus vicious practices 
spring up, creating sources of danger to 
constitutional right....State v. Holt, 
90 N.C. 749, 751, 47 Am.R. 554, 546-7 
(1884). 
Judge Merrimon was restating one of the basic premises 
of legal justice. The court's efforts to economize 
time, no matter how virtuous, should not be the over-
riding consideration of any case, particularly when 
these efforts operate to deprive a defendant of his 
constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. 
Both the Constitution of the United States 
and the Utah Constitution provide to an accused the 
right to an impartial jury. The Constitution of the 
United States reads in pertinent part as follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed....U.S. CONST, 
amend. VI. 
The Utah Constitution reads in pertinent part as follows: 
In criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall have the right....to have 
a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been 
committed UTAH CONST, art. 1, § 12. 
The jury bias statutes were written to assist the 
State in its efforts to insure that every defendant receives 
an impartial jury. Therefore, the preferred statutory 
construction is that which is harmonious with the 
constitutional prescription for an impartial jury. To 
meet this need for harmony, many state courts give the 
broadest possible construction to their statutes on 
jury selection and jury bias. Montana is one of these 
states and it's statute on jury bias is identical to 
the Utah statute under discussion. The statute is used 
as a collection of suggested exceptions; it is not 
regarded as a complete and exhaustive list. 
The constitutional right to a trial 
by an impartial jury is an unqualified 
one....It is beyond the power of the 
legislature to curtail the right, and 
therefore the provisions of the statutes 
which relate to the selection of a jury 
are to be understood as merely providing 
the means by which the constitutional 
* guaranty may be exercised to the fullest 
extent. State v. Brooks, 57 Mont. 480, 
188 P. 942/943 (1920). See also State 
v. Russell, 73 Mont. 240, 235 P. 712 
(1925) . 
Brooks involved a defendant who was convicted of the 
crime of sedition in obstructing the national Selective 
Draft Law. The defendant exhausted his pre-emptory 
challenges on jurors he had previously challenged for 
cause which challenges for cause were denied. The lower 
court stated that the facts of the case did not bring 
the jurors1 bias within any of Montana's statutory 
exceptions. On appeal, the court ordered a new trial 
stating that the right to an impartial jury is an 
unqualified right and that the Montana legislature could 
not limit that right. 
Other courts, preferring to work within the 
framework of the statutory language, have held that in 
criminal cases when the facts are such that an accused 
would be denied an impartial jury, that the statute 
should be construed to read that a juror is disqualified 
to serve on a case when he has previously served on a 
jury which tried and convicted another defendant for a 
similar but independent offense and the same state's 
witnesses testified. Priestly v. State, 19 Ariz. 371f 
171 P. 137 (1918); Roberts v. Statef 4 Ga.App. 378, 
61 S.E. 497 (1908); and Popp v. State, 44 Okla.Crim. 
220, 280 P. 478 (1929). 
In Priestly, the defendant was convicted of 
selling intoxicating liquors and appealed on the ground 
that he was not accorded a fair and impartial trial. The 
jury panel contained five men who had rendered a guilty 
verdict against a different defendant on a similar but 
independent charge. The state's witnesses in both cases 
were three detectives who corroborated one another's 
testimony. The sole defensive matter was an attack on 
the incredibility of the three detectives. The defendant's 
challenges for cause of these five jurors was overruled 
and, after having exhausted his four pre-emptory chal-
lenges, the defense was forced to accept on the impaneled 
jury a portion of those five male jurors. The court said: 
These objectionable jurors are no 
doubt good men and representative citizens, 
perfectly conscientious in the belief they 
expressed of an ability to be indifferent 
between the state and the defendant, not-
withstanding the knowledge they had obtained 
of the facts and witnesses in a court of 
justice where they had sat as jurors and 
given their verdict. So, too, the action 
of the learned trial judge (in overruling 
the objection), we are persuaded, was 
dictated by a proper sense of propriety 
and decorum. But the weakness and error 
in the ruling lay in the trial judge 
having that confidence in the ability of 
the jurors to be entirely impartial under 
the circumstances, which confidence the 
jurors had expressed, each in himself. 
Having passed upon the credibility of 
witnesses in a similar case, upon substan-
tially the same testimony, and having 
theretofore rendered a verdict on their 
oaths, it is not to be believed that they 
could sit upon this case with such an 
opinion previously formed without it 
influencing their action." Priestly at 
139. 
Accordingly, the court held that the defendant was denied 
his constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury. 
In another case similar to the one at bar, 
the defendant was convicted of selling intoxicating 
liquor. Popp, supra. The record showed that just pre-
ceeding the trial of this case, the mother of the defendant 
had been tried by a jury on a like charge which returned 
a verdict finding her guilty. The two state witnesses 
in this case were the only two used against the mother. 
The Popp court held that where certain jurors called for 
the trial of the defendant had just served in the trial 
of the mother on a like charge and where the witnesses 
in the cases were largely the same and the fairness and 
impartiality of the jurors for this reason was called 
into question, such jurors were not impartial within the 
meaning of the Constitution of the United States or of 
the Constitution of Oklahoma. 
The facts of the Roberts case, supra, closely 
parallel those of the case at bar. In Roberts, the 
state used the same witness in three successive and 
similar trials. The credibility of this sole witness 
had been unsuccessfully attacked in the two previous 
trials. Th£ only parties to the alleged incident were 
the defendant and the state's sole witness. 
Whether this sole witness to the 
criminal act charged against the defendant 
was worthy of credit was vital to the 
defense of the accused. If the jurors 
believed this witness, they would convict 
the accused; if they did not believe him, 
they would acquit. If they had believed 
him notwithstanding the attack made upon 
credit in the two former cases, it is 
certainly reasonable to presume that they 
would also believe him when a similar 
attack was made upon his credit by the 
defendant in the present case. At least, 
the jury who had tried the other two 
cases would come to the consideration of 
the present case entertaining an opinion 
that the sole witness against the defendant 
was worthy of credit. The defendant would 
therefore have the burden of combating a 
preconceived judgment or opinion formed 
by the jurors as to a most material fact 
in the case. Roberts at 498. 
Tlie
 Roberts court held that a previous judgment or opinion 
as to the credibility of a single witness against the 
defendant, expressed by the verdicts in two other cases, 
should disqualify the juror. See also Bowens v. State, 
116 Ga.App. 577, 158 S.E. 420 (1967). 
The case at bar, as in Priestly, supra, Popp, 
supra, and Roberts, supra, had as its sole defense an 
attack on the credibility of the state's witnesses. Two 
of the three witnesses merely attempted to corroborate 
the testimony of the third, Denise Giertz. But the only 
two witnesses to the alleged sale of heroin were Denise 
Giertz and the defendant. Denise Giertz and the two 
corroborating policemen were found credible in four prior 
trials in which four other defendants were tried and con-
victed on similar but independent offenses. Whether 
Denise Giertzf testimony against the defendant was worthy 
of credit was vital to the defense. If the jurors 
believed her, they would convict; if they did not believe 
her, they would acquit. Ms. Giertz1 credibility was a 
most material fact in the case. If her credibility had 
withstood four previous attacks by defease counsels, it 
was reasonable to presume that a fifth attack would like-
wise be frustrated. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, there are several ways to construe 
the Utah statute under discussion. The method applied in 
Haussener, supra, restricts the statutory exceptions to 
those enumerated in the statute. If a defendant's chal-
lange for cause of a juror is legitimate but doesn't fit 
within one of the statutory exceptions, his right to an 
impartial jury is denied. 
The two other methods attempt to harmonize 
state jury selection statutes with the right to an 
impartial jury as provided for in the state constitutions 
and the Constitution of the United States. 
Montana exemplified one approach wherein the 
courts have explicitly held that the legislature may not 
limit this unqualifiable right to an impartial jury. 
The statute is used as a collection of suggested exceptions 
rather than as an exhaustive list. 
Most other states work within the framework of 
the statutory language but do not qualify the defendant's 
right to an impartial jury even if the challenge for 
cause does not neatly fit into one of the exceptions. 
These states construe the statutory language to mean 
that a potential juror is disqualified for implied bias 
if he has served in trials of other defendants wherein 
the offenses were similar but independentf and where 
the same state's witnesses had testified and been found 
credible and the jury subsequently returned guilty ver-
dicts. Priestly, supra, Popp, supra, and Roberts, supra. 
These states recognize that this particular combination 
of facts denies to a defendant his right to an impartial 
jury unless the challenged jurors are disqualified. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-3-0-19(5) (1953) should be 
broadly construed to permit the disqualification of the 
four jury members challenged for cause for implied bias. 
Such a construction is consistent with Mr. Dixon's 
constitutional right to an impartial jury. 
